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Guha Krishnamurthi*
In his paper A (Moral) Prisoner's Dilemma: Character Ethics and Plea
Bargaining,' Andrew Ingram presents us with an interesting variation on the
famous Prisoner's Dilemma. Ingram's puzzle offers a change in perspective-a
Prosecutor's Dilemma. Two coconspirators scheme to jointly participate in a spree
of petty thefts. During one of the petty thefts, they run into misfortune-they are
caught. The police and prosecutor wisely suspect that more is going on, but
evidence is scant. The prosecutor offers both the following deal: spill the beans,
rat out your partner, and get a light(er) sentence. One accepts and one does not.
Ingram believes that, in accepting the plea, the snitch has shown herself to be less
honest-and less virtuous-than the loyal partner. Ingram argues that, in giving
the snitch a lighter sentence than the loyal partner, the plea bargaining system has
failed to preserve interests of justice.2 Therein lies the puzzle: plea bargaining is
an essential part of the criminal system, and yet it is on morally shaky grounds.
What is a prosecutor to do?
In my attempt to defuse the puzzle, I begin by briefly recapping Ingram's
argument and pointing to some of its implications. Then, in response, I proffer
some worries: I argue that Ingram's descriptions of the motivations of the
criminals are unpersuasive. Next, I argue that when we investigate the
prosecutor's options and the resulting ramifications, it becomes apparent how the
prosecutorial tactic of offering the deal to the two coconspirators attempts to
preserve justice., In particular, I argue that there are many interests to be balanced,
and use of the tactic is generally justifiable as an attempt to balance those many
interests. Finally, I argue that there are limitations on using the tactic to preserve
justice, and I distill basic guidelines for using the prosecutorial tactic that will
safeguard the moral foundations of accomplice plea bargaining.
* Associate, Irell & Manella LLP. B.S. and M.S., University of Michigan; M.A. and J.D.,
University of Texas. I would like to thank Sriram K. Raman, Abraham M. Howland, Michael J.
Stephan, and Laura E. Peterson for their thoughtful comments. Of course, I would also like to thank
Andrew Ingram for the opportunity to consider and respond to his intriguing puzzle. Finally, thanks
to the editing staff at the Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law for its excellent work. The title of this
piece is named after two great Marvin Gaye songs: MARvIN GAYE & KIM WESTON, It Takes Two, on
TAKE Two (Tamla Records 1966); and MARVIN GAYE, What's Going On, on WHAT'S GOING ON
(Tamla Records 1971).
I Andrew Ingram, A (Moral) Prisoner's Dilemma: Character Ethics and Plea Bargaining,
11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 161 (2013).
2 Id. at 169.
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I. A CHALLENGE TO ACCOMPLICE PLEA BARGAINING
A. A Tale of a Tactic Gone Awry
Ingram narrates the following story: Tracy and Louisa are high school
acquaintances. They happen to cross paths one day. They get to talking and, once
pleasantries are out of the way, they scheme to commit a string of petty thefts.
They participate in a number of thefts, and things go swimmingly. And along the
way, something else happens: friendship. But this wild ride comes to an abrupt
halt. One of their thefts goes wrong and they are caught by the police. A young
inspector, call her Nancy,3 with a sharp mind and a lot to prove, suspects that there
is more going on. She puts her Advanced Interrogation 301 skills to use and offers
each the prisoner's dilemma: if you snitch on the other about the extent of your
criminal dealings, then you will get a lighter sentence. Tracy accepts; Louisa
refuses. Tracy gets a lighter sentence; Louisa gets the book thrown at her.4 So,
should we be concerned? Ingram thinks so.
Here are some initial observations and background assumptions: Ingram
considers only the situation where the criminals are actually guilty of the more
serious conduct-that is, the scheme of thefts. As a result, he does not consider
issues relating to the verifiability of the snitch's assertions. I follow suit and
assume that the snitch's tattling must come with evidence that conclusively details
the criminals' involvement in the more serious conduct.5 Next, Ingram states that
his analysis is an "assessment of accomplice plea bargaining from the perspective
,6
of character ethics." Ingram then argues that there is a spectrum of virtue/vice
and criminals need not be "uniformly, indistinguishably bad." That is, "virtue is
distributed amongst [criminals] in varying degrees, just as it is in the social
This is an homage to Nancy Drew. CAROLYN KEENE, THE SECRET OF THE OLD CLOCK
(1930) (introducing the character of Nancy Drew).
4 Ingram, supra note 1, at 164.
5 If we assume thusly, notice that if there is no such evidence, then Tracy cannot effectively
snitch to satisfy the deal. Thus, the prosecutor need not worry about false confessions or wrong
information that would result in the wrongful conviction of Louisa (and, depending on the deal,
Tracy) on the more serious conduct. But one could imagine an accused providing false information
that convinces the prosecutor of the accomplice's guilt, after the snitch succumbs to interrogation
techniques, the specter of a long jail sentence, and the promise of leniency. In a fuller examination of
the prosecutor's analysis, this should be factored in. See infra note 39.
6 Ingram, supra note 1, at 1622. 1 think that Ingram's puzzle may actually proceed in some
form even without assuming a character-ethics perspective. Presumably, Ingram thinks that, by
snitching, Tracy engaged in a less honest/virtuous/moral action than Louisa. He might endorse the
position that, all other things being equal, one who commits less honest/virtuous/moral actions should
be punished more. This might seem less intuitive a proposition, because our punishment scheme very
apparently violates this maxim regularly. But my reasoning on solving this altered puzzle would be
similar to the reasoning set forth below. In any event, as Ingram is the master of the puzzle, I play by
his rules.
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mainstream." Finally, Ingram states that his argument is qualified: he says that
the prosecutorial tactic creates a risk of objectionably disparate punishment,
though in any particular case it may be the more virtuous person who agrees to
cooperate with law enforcement.
With this in mind, Ingram observes that actions are tied to character and that
the decision to snitch and take a lighter sentence is reflective of a criminal's
character.9 Ingram then goes on to say that the person who refuses the plea deal is
more honest (or more virtuous) than the person who accepts it.10 This is because
criminal relationships are just like other relationships. They involve and require
trust between the criminal conspirators. When a coconspirator confesses and turns
state's evidence against his accomplice, this can be a violation of trust. When one
violates a trust relationship, that act is immoral (or at least prima facie immoral)."
Then, Ingram makes the move from actions to character. He explains, "Actions
are indicative of character because they are manifestations of character, a point
recognized by philosophers and lay people alike . . . . [T]he fact that virtuous
thought, feeling, and action are intertwined makes it correct to draw inferences
from actions to traits and [vice versa]."l 2 Thus, Ingram reasons as follows: the
Id. Ingram devotes a lot of attention to this point, but I find it uncontroversial.
8 Id. at 162 n.2.
Id. at 164-65. One might question if all actions speak to the individual's character.
Sometimes we say that an action was "out of character." Youngjae Lee, Recidivism as Omission: A
Relational Account, 87 TEX. L. REv. 571, 585 (2009) (discussing actions that are "out of character"
and the resulting criminal responsibility). Since Ingram only argues that the tactic causes a "risk of
objectionably disparate punishment," he might respond that actions usually relate to character. I flag
this issue, but I assume arguendo that actions relate to character in the way Ingram suggests. For
more on the topic of the resulting criminal responsibility, see NICOLA LACEY, STATE PUNISHMENT:
POLITICAL PRINCIPLES AND COMMUNITY VALUES 66, 68, 71 (Ted Honderich ed., 1988); JEREMY
HORDER, EXCUSING CRIME 120 (2007); R.A. Duff, Choice, Character, and Criminal Liability, 12
LAW & PHIL. 373, 374-78 (1993); Jeremy Horder, Criminal Culpability: The Possibility ofa General
Theory, 12 LAW & PHIL. 193, 207 (1993); Peter Westen, An Attitudinal Theory ofExcuse, 25 LAW &
PHIL. 331, 332-33 (2006).
10 Ingram, supra note 1, at 164-65. Ingram slides between speaking of honesty and virtue.
Ingram states that he is talking about a broad notion of honesty. It is unclear to me whether he means
"honest" to be synonymous with "virtuous." I treat them as distinct terms in that there are virtues
other than honesty, but honesty is a virtue. Id. at 161-62 n.1.
1 Id. at 166. Ingram notes that prima facie moral wrongs may ultimately be morally correct
actions. Id at 166 n.8. This is close to how I understand the prosecutorial tactic to be justified,
although the harm of disproportional punishment might be a pro tanto harm, and not merely a prima
facie harm. See infra Part III.
12 Ingram elaborates, "On the philosophical side, a virtue is traditionally characterized as a
habit of thought, feeling, and action. The virtuous person is in the habit of performing virtuous deeds
because his thoughts and feeling are bent in that direction. He not only understands the reasons why
he should act a certain way but feels it to be proper as well. Feeling that something is the right thing
to do means taking joy in the task and its accomplishment, and it means being distressed or saddened
by seeing it neglected or the opposite done. The fact that she enjoys doing the right thing makes it so
that the virtuous person will do so readily and willingly, without having to think the matter over in
detail every time. For the virtuous person, doing the right thing is truly a habit in the sense that it is
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criminal who snitches violates the trust of his accomplice. On the other hand, the
criminal who keeps mum does not violate the trust of his accomplice. These
actions are indicative of the criminals' characters: The snitch is dishonest and
lacking in virtue; the loyal partner is not.
In light of that, Ingram reasons that the prosecutor's tactic runs afoul of
character-ethics considerations. Ingram espouses the principle that, all other things
being equal, less virtuous people should be punished more (and more virtuous
people should be punished less).13 Tracy and Louisa committed the same criminal
acts, so there is no reason for differentiation in punishment on this ground. Tracy
has shown herself to be less honest and therefore of worse character than Louisa.
Yet it is Tracy that receives leniency. Thus, use of this tactic results in a violation
of the principle. Nevertheless, Ingram does not call for the abolition of plea
bargaining. He recognizes its practical value, for example as an investigatory and
prosecutorial tool. So he simply argues that we have to consider this moral cost of
plea bargaining in the ledger. 14
B. Objections to Ingram's Puzzle and Ingram's Counters
First, Ingram notes that his conclusion might seem curious, as it would seem
that cooperating with law enforcement is indeed the ethical course of action.
Ingram responds by pointing out that we must take into account the incentives and
motivations of Tracy, the snitcher. The decision to cooperate is motivated by the
promise of leniency, not the desire for contrition and a respect for justice. This is
evidenced by the fact Tracy did not cooperate before the deal-and the resulting
leniency-was offered. Thus, Tracy was not more honest or more virtuous than
Louisa.'5
Second, Ingram addresses a corollary objection that inferring character from
actions might be more complex than he lets on. For example, Tracy and Louisa
may be of equal honesty; but it might be that Tracy has an illness-say, diabetes-
done consistently and spontaneously, as if it were an instinct or a reflex." Ingram, supra note 1, at
166-67.
" Id. at 167-68.
14 Id. Some might suggest that Ingram was not formulating a puzzle based on such a principle.
Rather, Ingram was simply stating that the prosecutorial tactic causes a disproportion in punishment
and this disproportional punishment is prima facie or pro tanto bad. But this bad can be weighed
against other results and ultimately justify use of the tactic on a case-by-case basis.
If this is what Ingram meant to argue, then we might think that Ingram's argument is less
dashing than it appeared. I understood the force of Ingram's argument as follows: there is a bedrock
principle that is being violated by using this tactic, and yet we persist with this morally precarious
prosecutorial tactic because of its practical utility. But if Ingram is merely pointing out that the tactic
has some bad consequences under certain conditions, and those are often outweighed by good
consequences, I am less surprised. Even considering this alternative argument, as shown infra in
Sections II.A-II.D, I think there are reasons to doubt that the tactic has those bad consequences.
" Id. at 168.
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that would make prison extremely difficult. As such, Tracy's and Louisa's actions
are not comparable; Tracy's condition makes her choices, and her deliberations
about those choices, different. It might be that if Louisa were in the same place,
she would choose the same. Ingram recognizes this pitfall, but says that ceteris
paribus-that is, "all [other] things being equal"-the less honest person will
choose to cooperate with the police. 16
Finally, Ingram addresses the point that his whole discussion concerns
character, while the penal system does not; rather, criminal punishment is aimed at
a person's actions, and not a person's character. Ingram responds that he agrees
that a penal system should focus on actions, in that a wrongful act is a necessary
condition for punishment. But he thinks that this is compatible with a penal
system that also concerns itself with character. As such, character-ethics concerns
cannot be dismissed without thoughtful consideration. 7
II. DEFUSING INGRAM'S PUZZLE
Ingram's puzzle is intriguing, but I think there are strong responses to whether
it poses any sustaining moral quandaries. First, I argue that there are plausible
alternative explanations for Tracy's and Louisa's conduct that deflate the puzzle.
Next, I argue that there are many interests to be balanced, and using the tactic is an
attempt to balance those interests. When analyzing that choice of offering the deal,
there will be different results in the balance of those interests. Ergo, all other
things are not equal. As a result, Ingram's governing principle is inapplicable and
thereby not violated.
A. In Defense of Tracy
One primary objection is that there is something counterintuitive about
Ingram labeling Tracy, who cooperates with the police, as less honest or less
virtuous than Louisa. As we have seen, Ingram responds that even though Tracy is
cooperating with the government to uncover wrongdoing, she is not motivated by
civic duty, but rather by her own selfish interests. Therefore, her action is not
indicative of honesty or virtue.
However, consider the following plausible explanation for Tracy's conduct:
Tracy, like everyone else, weighs her competing interests and acts to satisfy them,
depending on their strengths. Here, Tracy had a number of interests, some of
which were in tension: her duty of loyalty to Louisa, her civic duty, her duty to her
family, her self-interest, et cetera. Notice, though, that it is unclear that Tracy
16 See id. at 170.
1 Id. at 177. There is an unstated premise here that we should prefer to take into account
character-ethics considerations. The mere fact that character concerns are compatible-or not
disruptive-with action concerns does not establish that our system should concern itself with
character. I address this issue with more detail infra, in Section II.E.
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chose some other interest over honesty. It could be that Tracy estimated that her
civic duty and duty to Louisa-both duties that involve honesty-were in
equipoise. It was the other interests-and we can stipulate that they do not involve
honesty-that tipped the balance in favor of cooperation with the law enforcement.
Under this explanation of the circumstances, we cannot adjudge Tracy to be less
honest than Louisa; Tracy was primarily motivated by honesty, but honesty pulled
her in two directions, and then her other interests broke the tie and dictated her
action. Ingram considers all of this, but he finds it unpersuasive.' 8 He states that
there is no reason to think that the snitch is just being nudged, because he thinks
that most of the time the requisite virtue is nowhere in sight.'9
What Ingram does not consider is that it could be that Tracy was motivated
primarily by virtuous interests.20 The other interests in play, and perhaps the ones
that tipped the balance, might have been interests that resound in virtues other than
honesty, such as the obligation to provide for one's family. Thus, it is similarly
21
unclear whether Tracy was less virtuous than Louisa.
Even considering this, Ingram may hold his ground about his belief about the
common motivations of snitches. As Ingram notes, it is an empirical question.
Seemingly we are not in a position to resolve that empirical question, but I am
willing to assume arguendo Ingram's view about the snitch's motivations.
B. In Scrutiny ofLouisa
Even still, Ingram has overlooked some plausible alternative explanations of
Louisa's conduct. Louisa herself may not have been motivated by loyalty or
honesty. Louisa might have read up on the Prisoner's Dilemma22 and thought to
herself, "If Tracy mirrors my tight-lipped conduct, we'll both make it out Scot-
free." To be clear, here Louisa acts loyally, with an expectation of loyalty, not
because she values loyalty itself, but because she perceives loyalty as an
instrument to accomplish her selfish interests. This of course besmirches the
sterling reputation Ingram bequeathed Louisa, but it seems completely plausible.
If this is the case-and, given Ingram's cynical view of the snitch's motivations, I
" Id. at 168.
19 Id. at 174.
20 Id. Another explanation is that Tracy's obligation to honesty would have led her to refrain,
but her virtuous obligation to her family overwhelmed this obligation. Again, Tracy here might have
been motivated primarily by virtuous obligations.
21 Id. Notice that none of this assumes that Tracy and Louisa are in different situations. Tracy
and Louisa might have the exact same circumstances and distresses. Ingram's argument is that their
respective actions reveal that Tracy is less influenced by honesty and virtue than Louisa. My point is
just that Tracy may be weighing her interests in a way that is primarily influenced by honesty and
virtue. This is true even if Louisa is weighing the very same interests (though Louisa will of course
weigh them differently).
22 Steven Kuhn, Prisoner's Dilemma, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Spring Ed.
2009), available at http://plato.stanford.edularchives/spr2009/entries/prisoner-dilemma/.
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see no reason for him to deny it-then Louisa is no more honest or virtuous than
Tracy. In light of all this, I find Ingram's interpretation of the story unconvincing.
There are alternate explanations of Tracy's and Louisa's actions that call into
serious question whether Tracy the snitch is less honest (or virtuous) than Louisa.
C. Tinkering with the Facts?
At this point, one might object that I am unfairly tinkering with Ingram's
story.23 To clarify, I do not argue that Ingram's interpretation of the hypothetical is
implausible or impossible. My argument is that Ingram's description may not be
one that describes most, or even very many, cases. Thus, the relationship between
Tracy's and Louisa's conduct may not give us the insight into their respective
characters that Ingram thinks it does.
Recall that Ingram argues that the tactic creates a risk of objectionably
disparate punishment. What does Ingram mean by this? I submit that he cannot
simply mean that it is possible that, when using this tactic, objectionably disparate
punishment will result. Our criminal justice system-and any justice system ever
put into effect-risks mistakes. It might be better that ten guilty go free than one
innocent punished, but few would say it is better that 1,000,000 guilty go free than
one innocent punished.24 And with enough trials, an innocent will wrongly receive
punishment. So, if Ingram is merely pointing out that use of the tactic could
possibly result in relatively unequal punishment, in terms of character or
otherwise, we would happily assent to that point, yet think it unsurprising and
uninteresting. Thus, I think for his argument to be forceful Ingram must mean that
use of this tactic engenders this risk, because it is blind, perhaps willfully, to some
information that bears relevance to ensuring proportional punishment. Because it
is not clear that Ingram's description is probable or common, I argue that he has
not shown us any particularly relevant information about the characters of Tracy
and Louisa that the prosecutorial tactic fails to account for. Of course, there may
be situations that fit Ingram's story exactly. As argued below, even there, I argue
that use of the tactic may be completely justified.25
D. All Other Things Being Equal and the Risk ofDisproportionate Punishment
Ingram actually considers a similar, but distinct, objection: Tracy and Louisa
might have been in different circumstances, such that Tracy's and Louisa's actions
23 But while we are on the subject of questioning the hypothetical, we could also ponder
whether in most criminal-accomplice scenarios there truly is a trust relationship. One of the Journal
Editors raises this point with Ingram. Ingram, supra note 1, at 7 n.7. Again it is an empirical
question, but my intuition is that criminal accomplices know that when the curtain drops, it is, in the
words of the Three Stooges, "All for one. One for all. Every man for himself."
24 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 74 (4th ed. 2006) (discussing the
famous Blackstone aphorism).
25 See infra Part III.
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are not comparable. The situations might not indicate their respective virtues,
because Tracy might have particularly pressing circumstances that Louisa might
have herself succumbed to, had she been in the same position. Ingram agrees, but
he says that ceteris paribus-that is, "all [other] things being equal"-the less
honest person will choose to cooperate with the police.26
What should we make of this ceteris paribus maneuver? At first glance, there
is something fishy about abstracting away from the facts of a criminal's situation
and then making judgments about that criminal's character. However, as noted,
Ingram is not arguing that it is always the case that the less virtuous person will
cooperate with law enforcement. Instead, he is arguing that the prosecutorial tactic
"create[s] a risk" of this occurring. 27 Thus, through the ceteris paribus clause,
Ingram means to abstract to what would happen in the general case. Then, if he is
right about his descriptions of the motivations at play, this will establish that when
this tactic is used, there is a risk of punishing the virtuous more than the vicious.
This is a fair motivation for a ceteris paribus argument, but the devil is in the
details. How exactly does he envision us making the circumstances "equal" to
fulfill the ceteris paribus clause? Ingram does not tell us exactly what he has in
mind. Let us just say that Tracy and Louisa are eerie clones: same family, health,
financial situations, et cetera-even the same general system of values. And now
let us run the tape: Prosecutor Nancy offers the deal, Tracy accepts, Louisa refuses.
Notice, though, that the strongest objections to Ingram's assertion still stand:
Tracy might have plausibly acted for reasons of honesty, and, beyond honesty,
reasons that still sound in virtue. And in a similar vein, Louisa might have
plausibly acted for reasons of self-interest that do not sound in honesty or virtue.
Thus, it is unclear to me that Ingram has done more than tell us that it is possible
that objectionably disparate punishment will result. To be clear, he again has not
shown us any particularly relevant information about the respective characters of
Tracy and Louisa that the prosecutorial tactic fails to account for. It is possible
that Louisa is more virtuous than Tracy, but entirely possible that she is not. As
mentioned, Ingram notes the possibility of other explanations of the criminals'
conduct and recognizes it is an empirical question, but he states that he is confident
in his understanding of the criminal motive.28 I have noted my dissent, but my
skepticism is merely of the agnostic flavor. I do not mean to suggest Ingram is
wrong about the motives of the Tracy and Louisa archetypes, but until we get
resolution of that empirical question, I do not think Ingram has carried his burden
of showing that the prosecutorial tactic ignores relevant information about the
criminals' characters.
26 Ingram, supra note 1, at 170.
27 Id. at 162 n.2.
28 Id. at 173.
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E. Considering Character
Now Ingram might have one card left. He might protest that the prosecutorial
tactic is willfully blind to the most relevant information-it does not take into
account character at all. This dovetails with the final objection that Ingram
considers, namely that his analysis has proceeded under a character-ethics
framework, whereas the penal system is concerned with action and not character.
Ingram's response to this objection is that it is no objection at all, since a concern
with action is not incompatible with a concern for character. And, turning his
argumentative defense into offense, Ingram might suggest that since our penal
system's goals are compatible with a concern for character, it is a failing of the
prosecutorial tactic to ignore character considerations.
By way of background, the Anglo-American criminal law is generally
understood to be motivated by side-constrained consequentialism. 29 Under this
theory, punishment is motivated by consequentialist interests, but limited by
retributivist principles.30 To be clear, this means we punish in order to obtain a
better state of affairs, but this is subject to the constraint that we not punish anyone
more than they deserve. For the sake of argument, we can agree that side-
constrained consequentialism is compatible with a concern for character. But we
notice that character-ethics considerations play second fiddle to consequentialist
motivations very regularly. Consider Bert and Ernie. They have virtually the same
thoughts and (criminal) inclinations. Along comes a bright, grumpy Monday. Bert
has breakfast, Ernie does not. Bert and Ernie are on their respective ways to work,
when they encounter Oscar and Bhaskar-virtually identical trash-can dwellers on
different sides of town. Bert has a sudden bout of rage, and he pummels Oscar to
the point of grievous injury. Ernie has the same bout of rage, but after a single
punch, he feels weak and quits (as breakfast is the most important meal of the day).
Ingram would recognize that the difference in action here does not distinguish
29 Mitchell N. Berman, On the Moral Structure of White Collar Crime, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
301, 313 (2007) (characterizing side-constrained consequentialism as the "dominant principle" of
American law); Antony Duff, Legal Punishment, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (2008),
available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-punishment/ (detailing side-constrained
consequentialism).
30 I accept this common wisdom, but I suspect that there are retributivist motivations in our
penal sanctions. In this section, Ingram also discusses retributivism. In so doing, he characterizes
retributivism as focused on the criminal's actions and not his character. This characterization of
retributivism occurs to me to be askew. Although the term can be slippery in the literature, most
understand "retributivism" to be a theory of punishment that holds that criminal wrongdoers deserve
to be punished and that punishing criminal wrongdoers is an intrinsic good. DRESSLER, supra note
24, at 16 (discussing retributivism). Understood in this way, retributivism is entirely compatible with
a concern for character; it is possible for a retributivist to hold that a criminal wrongdoer deserves
punishment in light of his bad character, revealed by his criminal wrongdoing. Lee, supra note 9, at
579-84 (discussing character-based accounts of recidivism); see also VICTOR TADROS, CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY 53 (2005); ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 382-84 (1981); Michael
D. Bayles, Character, Purpose, and Criminal Responsibility, I LAW & PHIL. 5, 7 (1982). But no
harm done, for Ingram ultimately agrees.
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Bert's and Ernie's characters. Indeed, he says, "[o]n the philosophical side, a
virtue is traditionally characterized as a habit of thought, feeling, and action.
Bert and Ernie have the same thoughts, feelings, and urges to act-it's just that one
has the necessary calories to perform the grievous assault. Both are charged for
assault, but Bert gets a harsher punishment. Under our penal system, this result
may be justified by balancing the many different consequentialist interests and
retributivist limitations, like general and specific deterrence, incapacitation,
rehabilitation, respect for private thought, proportional punishment, et cetera.32
This is not surprising or controversial, and indeed Ingram agrees.33
So, with all that in mind, has Ingram's puzzle exposed a failure to consider
adequately concerns of character? I submit not.34 Recall that Ingram's motivating
principle is: all other things being equal, criminal punishment should punish less
virtuous individuals more, and punish more virtuous individuals less.3 s
Now, let us revisit Tracy and Louisa. Of course, I have argued that definitive
judgments about Tracy's and Louisa's character are greatly exaggerated. But, in
charity, let us proceed by granting that Tracy is less honest and less virtuous than
Louisa in the way Ingram imagines. I contend that Ingram's puzzle can be
explained by the fact that all other things are not equal. The way Ingram has set up
the hypothetical, the government has a choice: do not offer the deal and let the two
go free on the more serious criminal conduct, or offer the deal and nail at least one
of the two on the more serious conduct.
If the government does not offer Tracy and Louisa the deal, then it will allow
two criminals to go unpunished for the more serious conduct. This has a number
of detrimental consequences-we would lose out on incapacitation, rehabilitation,
specific deterrence, general deterrence, et cetera. Contrariwise, if the government
does offer the deal, it will result in a number of good consequences-like gaining
all the things lost above. To be sure, there will also be some detrimental
consequences here too, for example, disproportionate punishment between Tracy
and Louisa. Whether the net consequences are good or bad will come down to a
case-by-case determination. But what is clear is that all things are not equal.
31 Ingram, supra note 1, at 166 (emphasis in original).
32 The result is also justifiable under retributivist theories that do not locate desert solely in
character. For example, if the retributivist theory locates desert in conduct-that is, one deserves
punishment in light of his conduct, regardless of his character-then this result is justified, as Bert's
conduct was worse than Ernie's. Of course, one could question whether Bert and Ernie should be
punished differently, but my point here is a descriptive one.
33 Ingram, supra note 1, at 177.
34 This analysis depends on my interpretation of Ingram's argument, as discussed supra note
14. Under the alternative interpretation I suggest there, this part of my argument is inapplicable. In
its place, I would argue that our penal system is able to adequately consider concerns of character.
This is described in Part III and, in particular, infra note 38 and accompanying text.
3 Ingram, supra note 1, at 170-71.
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Therefore, the antecedent of Ingram's motivating principle is not satisfied and the
principle is not violated.
One might protest that I have mangled the puzzle, as the puzzle critically
assumes that our penal system was motivated primarily by character ethics. But
similar reasoning applies even in the character-ethics calculation: if the
government does not offer the deal, then it will be allowing vice to go
unpunished-Tracy and Louisa get off for the more serious conduct. If the
government does offer the deal, and it is accepted by Tracy, vice will be punished
with respect to Louisa, but there will be a relative inequality between Tracy and
Louisa. All other things are again not equal, so the antecedent of the principle
goes unsatisfied, the principle is inapplicable, and thus the principle is not violated.
To be clear, all I have shown at this point is that Ingram's puzzle about the
prosecutorial tactic has been defused. Ingram's puzzle rests on the following
principle: all other things being equal, criminal punishment should punish less
virtuous individuals more, and punish more virtuous individuals less. But the
prosecutor's choice between offering the deal and keeping mum does not leave all
other things equal. Thus, the principle is inapplicable to his hypothetical, and the
principle is not violated. There still remain questions about whether and when
using the prosecutorial tactic is justified.
III. JUSTIFYING THE TACTIC AND DISTILLING FOUNDATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR
THE TACTIC'S USE
The prosecutor's deal is generally justifiable, but there are circumstances
under which use of the tactic would be improper. I have just argued that Ingram's
riddle is solved when we consider the prosecutorial tactic as a tool to balancing the
many different interests of justice. If we consider the scenario under a side-
constrained consequentialist theory of punishment, those different interests include
inter alia incapacitation, rehabilitation, general deterrence, specific deterrence, and
proportional punishment. Depending on whether the government offers the deal or
not, these interests will be satisfied differently. All other things will not be equal,
and so the principle does not apply.
Now, whether the government should offer the deal or not depends on the
balance of the interests. This is of a course a case-by-case, fact-dependent
analysis. But one important point is that proportional punishment is an interest of
justice to be balanced. Ingram recognizes this when he says we must weigh the
moral cost of plea bargaining in deciding if it is justified. Let us now investigate
the weight of proportional punishment and the balance of the various interests at
play.
In terms of side-constrained consequentialism, proportional punishment
affects multiple considerations. First, it may relate to consequentialist goods to be
maximized. This depends critically on the brand of (side-constrained)
36 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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consequentialism and, specifically, what are the goods to be maximized. But as
one general example, proportional punishment can relate to general deterrence;
when the public sees criminals punished sensibly and predictably, the public is
better equipped and incentivized to follow the rules. Second, proportional
punishment may relate to the limitation on punishment according to negative
retributivist principles. The most important principle is, "One should not be
punished more than he deserves." In determining what punishment one deserves,
relative punishments may be relevant. For example, if a criminal receives a
punishment worse than others, this might be a declaration that his action is worse
than theirs. That statement itself is part of the criminal's punishment. Thus, we
may have to consider the severity of that statement in adjudging whether the
criminal is receiving his just deserts. Also, what about character? Most generally,
proportional punishment (and reward) of character incentivizes good character,
which relates to good consequences; at the same time, proportional punishment of
character concerns retributive limitations insofar as character is connected to
desert.
Proportional punishment, and the lack thereof, comes in degrees. There is
highly disproportionate punishment and there is marginally disproportionate
punishment, and shades all between. Marginally disproportionate punishment may
have no bad consequences at all; the difference in punishment could be so little
that people do not even notice. And marginally disproportionate punishment
might not affect a criminal's just deserts. If we agree that petty thieves deserve
thirty days of incarceration, but thieves often get out in twenty-eight days, we
might still assert that the thirty-day incarceration was just. In contrast, highly
disproportionate punishment can be extremely damaging. It can result in terrible
consequences-it can cause total loss of faith in the penal system, perhaps leading
to revolt, unrest, and behavior inconsistent with our norms. And it can also raise
serious questions about desert: we might be willing to agree, in the abstract, that a
thief deserves twelve years of incarceration; but upon seeing many thieves receive
only three years of incarceration, we might be concerned that it would exceed a
particular thief s just deserts to incarcerate him for twelve years.
The particular rules governing how to weigh the consequentialist interest of
proportional punishment, the retributive limitation on proportional punishment,
and the other interests floating around are surely difficult to enunciate and relate,
even when all the facts are filled in. As a broad, structural point, in a side-
constrained consequentialist penal system like our own, the prosecutor must weigh
the disproportion in punishment as an interest in justice against consequential
interests and the retributive limitations on punishment. Ergo, there are two parts to
n DRESSLER, supra note 24, at 19 (discussing the expressive theory of punishment).
3 But suppose character is not directly related to desert; suppose rather that desert is related
directly to the actions actually committed. If Thelma and Louise commit the very same acts, but we
punish Thelma worse for having a worse character, we might be violating a retributivist limitation on
punishment!
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this inquiry: First, when considering proportional punishment as a consequentialist
interest, if relative inequality in punishment results in net bad consequences-
outweighing the good consequences from using the tactic-the prosecutor must
refrain from offering the deal. Second, when considering proportional punishment
as a negative retributive interest, if relative inequality in punishment results in an
individual being punished more than he deserves, then the prosecutor must refrain
from offering the deal.' 9 If both hurdles are crossed, the prosecutor may offer the
gambit. Of course, the efficacy of the tactic-the likelihood that the snitch will
tattle-will likely be tied to higher disparity in punishment. The less punishment
offered the more likely the snitch will accept the deal. The prosecutor is tasked
with navigating these difficult waters.
Let us now revisit Tracy and Louisa. Suppose the more serious conduct
carries a sentence of ten years. Consider two potential versions of the prosecutor's
tactic: first, if Tracy cooperates, she gets seven years; and, second, if Tracy
cooperates, she receives a month of incarceration. Under the first, the
disproportion is not insignificant, but not intolerable. Seven years is a long time,
Tracy will be incapacitated and specifically deterred, and we will get some general
deterrence as well. The three-year difference might raise some questions about
what Louisa deserved. 4 0 But these are not overwhelming worries. Overall, this
deal seems like an acceptable balancing of the relevant interests.41 Contrastingly,
the second disparity is highly disproportionate. We get little incapacitation and
specific deterrence of Tracy, we might dent general deterrence to some extent
because of the story of Tracy's light sentence,42 and the difference between Tracy's
and Louisa's punishments is sufficient to raise serious questions about Louisa's
treatment. The positive results from offering the deal to Tracy are seemingly not
3 As discussed earlier, I do not consider the risk that the information provided by the snitch
might wrongly convict the accomplice. Supra note 5. But there is surely some risk of this in the real
world. One way to minimize this risk is to require more evidence/corroboration from the snitch.
However, the more evidence/corroboration required, the less likely the snitch will be to comply, even
if the snitch is telling the truth. This will decrease the effectiveness of the deal and result in bad
consequences. Indeed, it is quite difficult to measure this risk of false information; it is hard to
determine that a snitch's information implicating an accomplice is false, and it is all the more difficult
to determine the frequency of such cases. Because of the importance of plea bargaining in the penal
system, I think this is an interesting issue for future research.
40 Ingram might even suggest that the disproportion is more than three years, because Tracy
has a worse character than Louisa, and thus should be punished worse.
41 The real hurdle will be whether such mitigated punishment would incentivize Tracy to
accept the deal. Three years would be a sufficient incentive, in my opinion, but only Tracy knows the
answer to that question.
42 When stories of such large disparities in punishment become known, they have the
potential to erode confidence in the proper functioning of the penal system by diminishing would-be
criminals' perceived chance of being apprehended and punished appropriately for criminal conduct.
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worth the detriment it would cause to both consequentialist interests and
preserving retributive limitations. 3
Thus, in summation, I argue that the prosecutor's tactic, when sagely utilized,
is generally justifiable. The question is simple in form but complex in application:
Does using the tactic balance the interests of justice properly? Under a side-
constrained consequentialist theory of punishment, we must inquire whether using
the tactic results in net good consequences, without violating negative retributive
limits on punishment by punishing one more than they deserve. This analysis is
fully equipped to take into account character, insofar as proportionate punishment
of character relates to good consequences and retributive limitations.
IV. CONCLUSION
Plea bargaining has become an invaluable tool for prosecuting criminals, yet,
at the same time, it is not without controversy. Andrew Ingram has pointed us to
one potential worry in accomplice plea bargaining: where two equal accomplices
are offered the opportunity to cooperate against the other in exchange for leniency,
the one who accepts this offer may be the less honest, and the less virtuous. In
response, I have contended that this puzzle is not all too worrisome. First, I argued
that Ingram's description of the motivations of the criminals are not clearly
common or probable, and thus he has failed to show that using the tactic creates a
risk of objectionably disproportionate punishment. Then I argued that when we
investigate the prosecutor's options and the resulting ramifications, it becomes
apparent how the prosecutorial tactic attempts to preserve justice. In particular,
there are many interests to be balanced, and use of the tactic is generally justifiable
as an attempt to balance those many interests. Finally, understanding this role of
the prosecutorial tactic to preserve justice, I have argued that there are limitations
on using the tactic, and I have distilled basic guidelines for using the prosecutorial
tactic that will safeguard the moral foundations of accomplice plea bargaining.
These basic guidelines can be summed up in the following maxim: Do not miss the
forest for the trees, but do not forget that the tree is part of the forest.
43 I am certain that opinions will differ on my particular examples. The examples are merely
intended to convey the methodology of the analysis.
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